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Diffusion holds the key to both the mechanism of carbon emission and a solution to the problem 
of emission excesses. In essence, diffusion represents spatial dependence through connectivity 
between states and affects their policies or even regulations entailed in the framework of global 
governance. Even though it is of critical importance to climate governance in influencing trust 
and incentives for cooperation, diffusion has received limited attention from international 
relations analysts of climate change. Using spatial modeling and systemic international relations 
theories, we uncover that, on average, diffusion adversely affects other states’ emission 
efficiency and that emission by states with competitive trading activity is a major source of the 
adverse diffusion. This result holds even if international and domestic countervailing factors are 
taken into account. An in-sample simulation analysis confirms that, for better climate 
governance, the adverse diffusion can be neutralized by a coalition of numerous trading states, 
rather than by a limited number of large states (e.g., G20).  
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1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Diffusion holds the key to both the mechanism of carbon emission and a solution to the 
problem of emission excesses. In essence, diffusion represents spatial dependence through 
connectivity between states and affects their policies or even regulations entailed in the 
framework of global governance. Hence, the nature of diffusion has important implications not 
only for states’ policies, but also for global environmental cooperation.  
Suppose that emission in state i affects that in state j. If i’s regulation for emission reduction 
has a positive effect in reducing j’s emission, then diffusion can be regarded as a contributor to 
global governance. With the positive diffusion, the governance framework does not have to 
achieve universal membership since member states’ regulatory outcomes spread to nonmember 
states, creating an informal governance network. On the contrary, if i’s emission-reducing 
regulation has an adverse effect in increasing j’s emission, then diffusion should be viewed as a 
disturbance to climate governance, and then a large number of contracting states, or even 
universal membership, may be a necessary condition for effective governance. What this means 
is that a correct understanding of diffusion is essential for climate governance and the study of 
environmental cooperation. 
Accordingly, analysts have investigated various diffusion mechanisms, using sophisticated 
theoretical schemes and methodological tools. For instance, motivated by the trade-environment 
debate, Cao and Prakash (2010) examined the effect of trade competition on the pollution levels 
of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and biochemical oxygen demand (BOD). Likewise, Cao and Prakash 
(2012) analyzed the effect of trade competition on treaty commitments as well as the pollution 
levels of SO2 and BOD within domestic constraints characterized as veto players. Perkins and 
Neumayer (2008, 2009) assessed the influence of transnational linkage on the pollution 
efficiency of CO2 and SO2 by evaluating how transnational agents—trade, foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and telecommunication—help disseminate pollution control technologies 
from one state to another. In addition, they examined trade in specific industrial 
sectors—manufactured goods and machineries—as major domains of competitive diffusion. 
Last and not the least, Prakash and Potoski (2007) and Perkins and Neumayer (2010) 
investigated how trade, FDI, and business travel affect the adoption of global voluntary 
environmental standards known as the Global Compact and ISO 14001, while assessing 
intervening effects of states’ economic size and democracy.  
As reviewed above, the existing international relations studies of climate change analyzed 
diffusion based primarily on cross-border economic activity and domestic politics, paying 
limited attention to interstate politics and thus failing to comprehend diffusion in a broader 
context of global governance within which states are still important actors. However, in the real 
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world, economic activity and domestic politics are not the only driving forces behind diffusion. 
Diffusion takes various mechanisms and intermediaries with varying strengths and directions. 
As discussed in the next section, theories of international relations suggest that diffusion may be 
activated not only by economic interdependence, but also by state power and international 
organizations. Rightly, analysts of diffusion in other policy realms, such as financial 
liberalization and taxation, have taken these diffusion intermediaries into consideration in the 
context of coercion and emulation (Elkins et al. 2006, Cao 2009, 2010). Yet analysts of 
environmental diffusion have ignored political intermediaries because they were concerned 
primarily with economic agents and the relationship between economic liberalization and 
environmental protection by evaluating hypotheses concerning races either to the top or to the 
bottom (Vogel 1995, Neumayer 2001). Which theory provides a good approximation of the 
actual diffusion mechanism is a highly empirical question. 
Therefore, in analyzing diffusion in climate change, we seek to incorporate state power and 
international governmental organizations (IGOs) as diffusion intermediaries which have 
received limited scholarly attention. In doing so, we try to nest our analysis within the 
scholarship of international relations by employing systemic theories of realism, liberalism and 
constructivism. Realism, in particular, recognizes that state power is the primary engine of 
international relations and governance across various policy realms even in the age of 
heightened transnational movements (Hirst and Thompson 2009). This state-centric approach 
accords with the fact that states are still significant players as either regulators or facilitators of 
carbon emission or both. Indeed, almost all states are contracting parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNCCC) and have been making regulatory efforts 
in reducing carbon emission more or less. At the same time, as part of their sovereign roles, 
states encourage economic activity and stimulate growth through various public policy 
instruments, including infrastructure construction, public corporations, and industrial subsidies, 
all of which result in carbon emission.  
Likewise, IGOs are mixed blessings. In general, IGOs facilitate certain policy actions by 
providing member states with forums for learning and emulation of best practices as well as 
with regulatory, financial and other arrangements conducive to the policy actions. Specifically, 
regarding climate change, there exist pro-environment organizations, such as the United Nations 
Environmental Plan (UNEP) as the secretariat for UNCCC and the European Union (EU) for 
establishing a regional emission trading scheme. In contrast, there are other IGOs that have 
either opposed the need for reducing fossil fuel consumption (e.g., the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC]) or facilitated economic competition with limited 
environmental concerns (e.g., the World Trade Organization [WTO]).  
Thus, diffusion intermediaries may be not just trade, but also state power and IGOs. These 
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intermediaries generate diffusion in either positive or negative directions through their distinct 
arrangements, resources, and techniques. Given these possibilities, it is appropriate for us to 
analyze diffusion on climate change comprehensively from the varying theoretical perspectives.  
 This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces international relations theories in 
relation to an analysis of diffusion and derives working hypotheses from them. Section 3 
presents a statistical model and data to test the hypotheses. Section 4 provides statistical results, 
discussion, and an in-sample simulation. Given these results, Section 5 concludes the paper, 
providing hints for analytical refinements and policy implications regarding the future direction 
of climate governance. 
 
 
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES  
 
Diffusion means the transmission of substances, norms, ideas, or technologies from one unit 
to another. Strang and Soule (1998, 266) and Eyestone (1977, 441) defined diffusion as the 
“spread of something within a social system.” When it changes the behavior of units, diffusion 
becomes a “pattern of successive adoptions of a policy.” This suggests the dispersion or 
dissemination of a practice throughout a population: that is, multiple adoptions of basically 
similar practices. The adoption is due to various mechanisms, including coercion, competition, 
learning, and emulation (Elkins, et al. 2006). Each of the diffusion mechanisms constitutes 
important international dynamics. Thus, theorists of international relations have discussed the 
mechanisms and intermediaries of diffusion in the context of their distinct worldviews. In 
general, realists focus on coercion and state power, liberalists competition and economic 
interdependence, and constructivists emulation and communication. Despite these varying 
theoretical concerns, as mentioned earlier, empirical analysts of environmental diffusion have 
focused on economic interdependence, paying limited attention to alternative diffusion 
mechanisms and intermediaries. In what follows, we summarize the diffusion mechanisms 
outlined by the three major theories and develop working hypotheses for our empirical analysis 
in the realm of climate change.  
 
2.1 State power 
Diffusion may not be horizontal. It may be vertical, dictated by power and centrality 
(Ballester et al. 2006, Bonacich 1987). Among international relations theories, power and 
centrality are the major concerns of realism. From the realist perspective, great powers or 
hegemons have the abilities to impose coercion or inducement that drives diffusion. Such 
arguments are often invoked to explain international regimes as well as interstate dependence. 
4 
 
Classical realists, such as Carr (1939), Morgenthau (1985), argue that major states employ a 
variety of strategies, including arms, trade, investment, etc., to expand their political and 
economic interests in geographical or policy domains. Krasner (1976) has maintained that 
international regimes almost invariably reflect the interests, power, and intervention of great 
powers. Waltz (1979) presents a neorealist claim in a general form—powerful states predictably 
seek to impose their (arbitrary) views on other states. Yet realists are agnostic in specifying the 
type of policy influence projected by a great power, ascribing it to the political ideology held by 
the great power (e.g., Morgenthau 1985, pp. 99-110). Thus, realism may hypothesize that the 
greater state j’s power relative to state i, the greater influence j’s climate policy has on i, and 
the greater the diffusion in either a positive (emission-reducing) or a negative 
(emission-increasing) direction.  
 
2.2 Economic interdependence  
A second hypothesis posits that diffusion is a horizontal process associated with economic 
interdependence. The magnitude and direction of diffusion are determined by a process between 
units, often characterized as competition or learning. In general, strategic interdependence is 
said to arise whenever the actions of some unit(s) affect the marginal utility of alternative 
actions for some other unit(s). (We follow Brueckner 2003; see also Braun and Gilardi 2006.)  
Consider two states, i and j, with (indirect) utilities from their alternative actions or policies. 
The two states have (homogenous) population preferences regarding the economy and 
environment. When state i chooses its policy to maximize its own welfare, this alters the 
optimal policy in j, and vice versa. Due to environmental externalities (e.g., carbon spillovers), 
welfare (i.e., a combination of climate stability and economic growth) in each state will depend 
on both states’ actions. Due to externalities, i’s utility depends on its policy and that of j. This 
implies that actions by i induce j either to move in the same direction, making i and j strategic 
complements, or to move in opposite directions as strategic substitutes. 
In this paper, we focus strategic complements for the following reason. In the short run, 
strategic substitutes may appear when states are unable to adjust their behavior quickly to those 
of related states due to transaction costs or other policy stickiness. In the long run, however, 
states implement gradual adjustments and make interstate relations strategically complementary, 
with state policies moving in the same direction.  
A case of strategic complement ensues in concert with technological diffusion via learning. 
Such learning takes place when state i imports energy-efficient products (e.g., electronic 
automobiles) from state j. In turn, this incentivizes state i to learn environmentally-sound 
technologies from state j (Tews, et al. 2003, Vogel 1997). However, such learning processes 
might not occur in trading irrelevant products (e.g., agricultural products and foods). Learning 
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might occur in the opposite direction from transacting energy-inefficient products (e.g., 
fuel-inefficient automobiles). Without good qualitative import restrictions, these products are 
imported into state i, worsening its emission efficiency. In sum, we assume that diffusion via 
learning is driven by state i’s importation of specific products. The greater the energy-efficient 
(-inefficient) exports, the greater the positive (negative) diffusion. 
A second case of strategic complement is that state i follows the climate performance of its 
competitors who compete in the same export markets. For instance, if firms in state i are 
energy-efficient and are faced with diluted environmental regulations in state k’s markets, they 
will lose their market shares with their costly energy-efficient products insofar as firms in state j 
can send their cheap energy-inefficient products to k’s markets. This compels firms in i to shift 
their costly energy-efficient products to cheaper energy-inefficient ones (Borgatti and Everett 
1992). The opposite is true for enhanced environmental regulations in export markets that 
encourage firms in both states to manufacture energy-efficient products in order to expand their 
market shares. Thus, it can be hypothesized that the more intensely state i’s firms compete for 




A third hypothesis, consistent with the theory of social constructivism, posits that the 
magnitude and direction of spatial dependence are determined by the density of social 
communication between states. Repeated interstate communication promotes socialization and 
assimilation, which in turn facilitate behavioral convergence between them (Johnston 2001, 
Granovetter 1985, Uzzi 1996). In this vein, IGOs play an important communicative function as 
well as monitoring, regulatory and secretariat functions for contracting states of international 
treaties. Risse (2000) argues that IGOs perform a focal-point role by sponsoring regular policy 
forums where member states’ policy-makers, regulators, IGO officials and NGO representatives 
exchange experiences, ideas and “best” practices, while nurturing trust and comraderies among 
them at professional levels. In doing so, IGOs generate multilateral pressure in ameliorating the 
hierarchical, coercive characteristics of interstate relations, turning them into cooperative ones 
(Ruggie 1993).  
More specifically, if two states, i and j, share a number of IGO memberships, then they gain 
opportunities to communicate, deliberate and share “best” practices. The process is identical to 
what is called learning or emulation in the diffusion literature (Elkins et el. 2006). As noted 
earlier, constructivists are silent about specific policy directions associated with interstate 
cooperation mediated by IGOs, given their policy heterogeneity (either pro- or 
anti-environment). Thus, it is conjectured that the more joint IGO memberships states have, the 
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greater the diffusion in either a positive or a negative direction.  
 
 
3.  METHODS AND DATA 
 
3.1 Model 
To evaluate the three hypotheses empirically, we use a spatial autoregressive model (SAR 
model or spatial lag model) that has been employed to analyze diffusion or spatial dependence.
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The SAR model helps us investigate how unit i’s policy choice (dependent variable) is affected 
by the nearby unit j’s policy choice (lagged dependent variable as function).  
The SAR model is specified as follows:  
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝜑𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝓍𝑖,𝑡𝛽 + 𝜌𝑤𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1𝑦𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
     In our analysis, we seek to explain climate performance measured as the amount of CO2 
emissions per GDP 𝑦𝑖,𝑡   as a function of variables of the diffusion mechanism suggested by an 
international relations theory as well as other control variables. Most importantly, the spatial 
component, 𝜌𝑊𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1𝑦𝑗,𝑡−1, represents the temporarily lagged spatial lag term to account for a 
diffusion effect as the weighted average of country j’s climate performance. The connectivity 
matrix or spatial-weighting matrix, W, is an N by N matrix where N is the number of states, with 
elements 𝑤𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 capturing relative connectivity or influence from state j to i. We 
row-standardize a spatial matrix in the model, which generates 𝑤𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1𝑦𝑗,𝑡−1, a weighted average 
of other observations.  
According to Neumayer and Plumper (2012) and Franzese and Hayes (2008a, pp. 8-9), the 
relative and absolute accuracy and power with which the spatial lag weights, 𝑊𝑖,𝑗, reflect and 
can gain leverage upon the interdependence mechanisms actually operating empirically and 
with which the domestic, exogenous-external, and/or context-conditional parts of the model can 
reflect and gain leverage upon the common-shocks alternatives critically affect the empirical 
attempt to distinguish and evaluate their relative strength because the two mechanisms produce 
similar effects. Furthermore, in order to mitigate a simultaneity bias in estimation of the SAR 
model, the spatial component, 𝜌𝑊𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1𝑦𝑗,𝑡−1, is lagged by one year, assuming that an outcome 
in state i is affected by those in other connected states after a time lag. 
 The spatial coefficient denoted by 𝜌 varies between -1 and 1 and measures the strength of 
spatial dependence between states, but restricts the directions of spatial dependence globally. 
This is due to the two constraints – (1) the weight matrix is row-standardized and (2) the 
direction of dependence is captured solely by the ρ coefficient. Thus, the ρ coefficient 
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indicates the globally uniform direction of spatial dependence between states. A positive 
coefficient indicates strategic complement, while a negative coefficient strategic substitute. 
Locally heterogeneous directions may be indicated by a non-standardized weight matrix that 
finely captures the heterogeneous directions as well as the strengths of spatial dependence 
between states. Nonetheless, methodologically, the global restriction is justified by our 
analytical objective of uncovering the generalized direction of diffusion due to a particular 
intermediary, while, theoretically, it is justified by the systemic international relations theories 
used to guide our analysis.  
As for other explanatory variables in the model, 𝜑𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 represents the effects of lagged 
dependent variable, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, and 𝓍𝑖,𝑡𝛽 captures the effects of state-specific characteristics and 
international arrangements. In addition, state-specific fixed effects 𝐶𝑖 are added to the model to 
allow for cross-sectional heterogeneity.  
 
3.2 Dependent variable 
In our analysis, we employ the amount of CO2 emissions (gram per gross domestic product 
[GDP] using purchasing power parity based on US dollars) as the dependent variable. The 
variable indicates the “efficiency” of CO2 emission in state i by measuring how much CO2 state 
i emits to obtain per GDP.
2
 This GDP-adjusted emission variable is a good proxy of climate 
performance for a cross-national analysis where states vary considerably in economic size. The 
data cover 132 states for the period 1991-2008 and are drawn from the website of the 
International Energy Agency (IEA). 
  
3.3 Independent variables  
Among the explanatory variables of the model, the key is a spatial weight, a connectivity 
matrix W. There exists no scholarly consensus on the correct specification of connectivity for 
diffusion. As discussed in the preceding section, theorists have discussed coercion, competition 
and emulation as plausible diffusion mechanisms in conjunction with the related international 
relations theories, realism, liberalism and constructivism, respectively. In our analysis, we have 
attempted to find the best analytical model among the alternatives. To do so, we have created 
several spatial weight matrices that represent the essence of the diffusion mechanism informed 
by the theories: Each matrix indicates how a pair of states are related or connected with each 
other, based on a particular theory. These matrices are specified as follows. 
 
(1) GDP According to realism, the size of a state’s economy indicates its state power for 
coercion as the primary diffusion intermediary. Since power is relative, we calculate a ratio of 
state i’s real GDP to state j’s real GDP. It is conjectured that the greater i’s GDP is relative to j’s, 
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the stronger the former’s diffusion effect on the latter, irrespective of distance, the extent of 
interdependence, or the strength of social association. Thus, a first spatial weight matrix is 
composed of row-standardized elements (i.e. the weights in each row sum to unity) that each 
indicate the ratio of state i’s real GDP (row) to state j’s real GDP (column). In this GDP-based 
matrix, the upper-triangular elements are just the inverses of the lower-triangular elements. We 
have obtained GDP data from the World Bank open database. 
(2) Trade A second set of spatial weight matrices presuppose that diffusion accrues from 
processes of economic interdependence characterized as competition and learning. To evaluate 
these hypotheses, we created two connectivity matrices from bilateral trade data (Feenstra et al. 
1997). The first connectivity matrix accounts for learning and indicates the strength of trade 
connection as the value of i’s import of various pollution-intensive products from j. We 
considered products, including chemical products (section 5 in the United Nations’ Standard 
International Trade Classification [SITC]), manufactured goods (section 6), and machineries 
and transport equipment (section 7).  
The second connectivity matrix indicates the extent of competition between states i and j in 
the exportation of the abovementioned industrial products. Following Cao and Prakash (2010, 
2012), we generated the matrix by calculating the structural equivalence of export profiles, or 
the extent of trade competition between i and j in the export markets specified below (Snyder 
and Kick 1979).
3
 Compared with the existing studies examining trade as a main diffusion 
intermediary, our specification of trade-based spatial weight matrices is unique in that we 
attempt to analyze the combined effects of trade-related learning and competition on diffusion. 
Our specification differs from those in the existing studies as follows. In constructing a spatial 
matrix for learning through trade, Perkins and Neumayer (2009, 2010) measured bilateral trade 
connectivity in specific sectors. Although they included manufactured goods and machineries, 
they excluded chemical products, another powerful emission-intensive sector, and thus 
effectively removed competition effects through these sectors from their analysis. In this vein, 
Cao and Prakash (2010, 2012) incorporated competition into their spatial weight by calculating 
structural equivalence. While their specification covered competition in all traded products, our 
specification focuses on competition only in emission-intensive sectors. Having employed the 
two spatial weight matrices, we compared their performance statistically and selected the 
best-fit matrix for the data (learning based on section 5), as explained in the next section.
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(3) IGOs Consistent with social constructivism, a third spatial weight measures the thickness 
of social communication as the frequency of joint memberships of IGOs between state i and 
state j. More specifically, the IGO-based spatial weight matrix is composed of row-standardized 
elements of the frequency of joint IGO memberships and is symmetric in that the influence of i 
on j is assumed to be equivalent to that of j on i. The data on IGO memberships is drawn from 
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the Correlates of War project (Pevehouse et al. 2004).  
 
The elements in the matrices are “row-standardized”: they indicate weights in each row sum 
to unity, thus measuring the relative strength of connectivity between states that determines the 
magnitude of climate performance diffusion from one state to another. Assuming that the 
system structure does not drastically change in the short run (seventeen years in our data), we 
constructed all W matrices from the data of year 2000, the mean year of the observations. 
 
3.4 Control variables 
The model includes several control variables at the international and domestic levels that are 
expected to counteract with diffusion captured by the spatial component. At the international 
level, we highlight two international governing schemes, environmental aid and the Kyoto 
Protocol, that are likely to have reducing effects on CO2 emission in the recipient states and the 
ratifying states, respectively.  
The first variable, Envaid, represents the natural logarithm of the amount of environmental 
aid (US dollar) that state i receives in a given year. Envaid is created based on PLAID 1.9 aid 
data.
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 The natural logarithm is taken to account for a decreasing effectiveness of aid as the 
amount of aid increases. We expect that aid is positively associated with CO2 emission 
efficiency (the coefficient is expected to be negatively signed). The second variable, Kyotoc, is a 
binary variable that indicates whether or not state i is a ratifying state of the Kyoto Protocol in a 
given year.  
As for domestic factors counteracting with diffusion, we include variables related to political 
liberty, personal income, and urbanization. First, as reported by (Busch and Jörgens 2005), a 
politically liberal state is expected to achieve better climate performance than its non-liberal 
counterpart because public preferences on environmental protection are more likely to be 
channeled into political arenas in the former than in the latter. This hypothesis of political 
liberalism is tested, using the categorical variable that is derived from the index of “civil liberty” 
in the Freedom-House data. Second, as theorized by Inglehart (1977) and shown by (Dasgupta 
et al. 2001), economic affluence, measured by GDP per capita, is expected to facilitate 
environmental protection and improve emission efficiency because of post-materialistic human 
conscience and technological progress. However, modernization has a pitfall: concentrated 
population in urban cities is likely to worsen emission efficiency because of human and traffic 
congestion. The level of urbanization in state i is measured by the ratio of urban population to 
the state’s total population. The data is retrieved from the World Development Index (WDI) 




4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 We have estimated a fixed-effect version of the proposed SAR model with a spatial weight 
via maximum likelihood (MLE) (Franzese and Hays 2006, 2008a). MLE is used both because it 
is an efficient estimator and because it facilitates comparison of rival models based on an 
information criterion that is important to our analysis, as explained earlier. The pooled 
cross-national time-series data cover 132 countries and the period between 1991 and 2008. The 
estimates are summarized in Table 1. 
 
4.1 Model selection and primary diffusion intermediary  
The statistical fit of all three spatial models (2-4) with the data is good.
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 The coefficient 
estimates for the control variables are consistent with intuition, thus buttressing confidence in 
the model and hypothesis tests. Most importantly, none of the three diffusion mechanisms 
postulated in the models can be falsified by the data in absolute terms. However, different 
results appear in relative terms. We have compared the models whose difference hinges solely 
on spatial weight matrices and selected the best spatial model that fit the data most closely. To 
do so, we have exploited the flexibility of spatial modeling by examining the fit of alternative 
spatial matrices with the standard test statistic, the Akaike information criterion (AIC), known 
as a reliable test statistic for model selection (Kostov 2010). 
As shown in Table 1, comparison of AIC across the models leads us to conclude that the best 
fitted model is the SAR model (3) with the learning matrix based on chemical products (section 
5). The SAR model (2) with the GDP-based matrix and the SAR model (4) with the IGO-based 
matrix perform worse than the model (3).
7
 We argue based on these results that the diffusion 
mechanism, a major component of the informal climate change governance, hinges on learning 
through trade interdependence and accords with the theory of liberal internationalism. Our 
assessment is consistent with the overall result of the previous studies (Perkins and Neumayer 
2008, 2009) showing that diffusion is driven by learning via trade interdependence. Nonetheless, 
we have revealed that adverse diffusion transpires through pollution-intensive chemical 
products, which is not well captured by the previous studies. We also have found through the 
experiments reported in note 4 that trade in the pollution-intensive chemical sectors induces 
learning, rather than competition, providing the basis for the best fitted SAR model (3).  
This empirical assessment leads to a normative argument that the improvement of climate 
governance has to rely on numerous trading states as opposed to economically powerful ones. 
While there is similarity between the two types of states, the diffusion mechanisms differ, 
nonetheless. Conceptually, realism presupposes a vertical channel based on material power, 
whereas liberal internationalism uses a horizontal channel based on interdependence processes. 
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The relative importance of the latter has a significant policy implication that will be discussed in 
the last section of this paper. 
 
4.2 Diffusion effect  
Given the model selection, we rely on the best-fitted model (3) for evaluating the diffusion 
effect as well as the coefficient estimates for the explanatory variables. In the model (3), 
diffusion is found to be substantial. The extent of spatial dependence, measured by the ρ 
coefficient for the spatial autoregressive term, is estimated to be moderate at .36, positive and 
significant at the 95 % level. We conducted the Wald test whereby to reject the null hypothesis 
of ρ being equal to 0 at the 1 % level. With the significant ρ, the SAR model (3) is judged as 
empirically more appropriate than the ordinary least square (OLS) model (1) without a spatial 
construct.  
We have re-estimated the model without the spatial (diffusion) component and calculated the 
total of predicted values (823,220.6 gram per GDP) which is smaller than the total of actual 
values (1,117,407.6 gram per GDP). This means that, on average, states in the data are exposed 
to adverse diffusion that has a substantial effect in increasing their emission by approximately 
294,187 gram per GDP. This adverse or negative diffusion effect is substantial, accounting for 
approximately 36 percent of the total emission. Moreover, the diffusion effect is a major 
perpetrator of international discord in climate governance which is often underestimated by 
states negotiating for solutions to the global problem. Emission performance in a state is not 
insular, but is influenced significantly by that in other states through cross-border diffusion. 
Diffusion is integral part of the global problem of climate change. 
 
4.3 Domestic countervailing factors  
The coefficient estimate for the lagged dependent variable is positive and large, meaning 
considerable inertia in the dependent variable that is translated into the difficulty reducing 
carbon emission as a derivative of economic activity based on widely available fossil fuels. 
Although this intractability of carbon emission reduction is a fact of life, our analysis indicates 
the significance of interventions.  
With a significant ρ coefficient reported above, a spatial model becomes effective in 
discerning estimates of the direct, indirect and total effects of an explanatory variable, given its 
spatial component. In general, the greater the ρ coefficient, the greater the indirect effect 
relative to the total effect. Contrastingly, if the ρ coefficient were to be indistinguishable from 
zero, an indirect effect would become negligible with a total effect becoming equal to a direct 
effect. With a moderate ρ coefficient (.36) estimated in the model (3), indirect effects are also 
moderate, providing domestic control variables with latitudes to take direct effect without 
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diffusion disturbance.  
The carbon-reducing domestic variables represented by political liberty and personal income 
acquire significant and negative coefficient estimates. Economic modernization involves a 
dilemma that prosperity characterized as a rise in income is often accompanied by urbanization, 
while political modernization helps climate stability weakly by improving human consciousness 
through civil liberty. These estimates suggest that carbon emission reduction is best achieved by 
a combination of high income, high civil liberty, and low urbanization. What this means is that 
carbon emission reduction is not a linear function of domestic politico-economic progress and 
thus has to be guided by prudent international policy interventions—the Kyoto Protocol and the 
environmental aid regime in our analysis. 
 
4.4 International countervailing factors  
The Kyoto Protocol is the first and only international implementation treaty to tackle carbon 
emission covered in the data. The coefficient for the dummy variable for the ratifying states and 
years is estimated to be negative and significant. This means that the Kyoto Protocol generated 
a significant reducing effect. It is worth noting that a relatively large indirect effect of the treaty 
is estimated in the model (3). Despite the effect, several ratifying states have abandoned the 
Kyoto Protocol because a greater number of non-ratifying states have taken free ride on their 
efforts, disseminating their regulatory negligence into ratifying states via diffusion.  
As for environmental aid, our statistical analysis shows that even the weak aid regime is 
registered as a significant contributor to emission reduction in the recipient states. The aid 
regime has not been established formerly by the Kyoto Protocol although the protocol set forth 
the clean development mechanism (CDM) and joint implementation (JI) that facilitate 
technological transfers from high-income states to medium- and low-income states on the basis 
of market principles. Many developed states have funneled CO2-reducing aid as part of their 
official developmental assistance (ODA) programs, including renewable energy, fuel-efficient 
power plants and urban transportation systems, etc.  
As indicated in Table 1, aid generates both a significant direct and a significant indirect effect 
in reducing carbon emission. Aid strengthens a recipient’s capacity directly and influences its 
reduction performance indirectly via the improvement of its trading states’ capacities.8 The 
indirect effect of aid, albeit informal, should be counted as an important component of the 
climate governance. It is interpreted that aid may stimulate the competitive or the learning 
process in a recipient state observing the improvement of performance in its trading partner with 
aid and thus becoming a bit more motivated to reduce emission than otherwise, insofar as they 
believe that more aid is funneled to good performers than to mediocre performers (Indeed, our 
auxiliary analysis has confirmed that more aid is given to states with large emission reduction 
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than to those with small reduction.).  
Despite significance, environmental aid fails to offset the diffusion effect of carbon emission 
from rich exporting states to low-income importing states. Causes of aid inefficiency may be 
multifaceted. First, aid is too small in value to improve developing states’ carbon-reducing 
capacities significantly. Second, aid has a marginally decreasing function of emission reduction 
because of technological limitations. Third, the environmental aid regime has no mechanism to 
correct recipients’ administrative and political deficiencies. Donors view such deficiencies as a 
structural impediment against the efficient use of aid money and thus are reluctant to expand 
their aid. This last reason links aid ineffectiveness to the small size of aid programs noted above, 
generating vicious circularity within the aid regime. This line of argument does not reject the 
potential efficacy of an aid regime in facilitating carbon emission reduction. As shown in the 
SAR model, environmental aid, albeit insufficient in size, has an independent and significant 
effect in reducing carbon emission by recipient states. 
Thus far, our findings indicate the following. First, states’ poor climate performance generates 
adverse diffusion to other states via trade interdependence. Second, the adverse diffusion is too 
immense to be contained by the international countervailing factors of the environmental treaty 
and aid regime as well as by the domestic countervailing factors of political liberty and 
economic affluence. The existing governance framework is vulnerable to adverse diffusion 
precipitated by competitive trading states. What would be an alternative governance 
framework? 
 
4.5 Simulation analysis  
To evaluate this point further, we have conducted the following simulation analysis. We are 
interested in knowing a coalition of states that is most suitable for eliminating the adverse 
diffusion effect and thus facilitating effective climate governance at reasonable 
efficiency-improving costs. The candidate coalitions we evaluated include (1) G20, (2) the 
Kyoto Protocol Annex 1 without the United States, (3) Annex 1 (original contracting states 
including the United States), (4) a hypothetical coalition of states with GDP per capita of over 
US $10,000 and (5) another hypothetical coalition of states with GDP per capita of over US 
$5,000.  
The simulation procedure is outlined as follows. First, we re-estimated the model without the 
spatial component and calculated the total of the predicted values that disregarded diffusion. As 
reported earlier, the value is smaller than the total of the predicted values of the original SAR 
model. The difference between the two totals can be derived from cross-national diffusion. 
Second, we re-estimated the SAR model with improved emission efficiency at varying rates in 
the specified coalitions of states outlined above. The simulation results are shown in Figure 1. 
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The in-sample simulation results indicate that, among the alternatives, a coalition of states 
over $5000 in (5) is the only one that can achieve the elimination of adverse diffusion with the 
efficiency improvement rate of approximately 24 percent. In contrast, other coalitions fail to 
eliminate the adverse diffusion. Consistent with intuition, the more states participate in the 
coalition, the lesser the burden for each state. However, in general, the difficulty of obtaining 
consent becomes severe as the income threshold lowers with the expansion of a coalition. 
Developing states have continuously claimed that they are immune to legal responsibilities for 
reducing carbon emission because their accumulated emissions are much less than those of 
developed states that have emitted carbon since the Industrial Revolution. They embrace the 
principle of common-but-differentiated responsibilities that has influenced international climate 
talks and coalition formation since the Berlin meeting—the first Conference of Parties (COP 1) 
of UNFCCC in 1993.  
The in-sample simulation results indicate that, without participation by a number of 
developing states, it would have been extremely difficult to achieve the elimination of adverse 
diffusion and thus facilitate international cooperation. The results support the claim that the 
failure to hold these states legally responsible for emission reduction is a major cause of 
international discord. This is the well-known intractable dilemma that has plagued international 
negotiations for climate governance. What is new here derived from the empirical search is that 
an efficiency-improving coalition requires not large states, but trading states that are in a 
position to generate (and reduce) diffusion via trade.  
 
 
5. CONTRIBUTIONS AND CONCLUSION 
  
 In this paper, we have tried to shed light on diffusion that has received limited attention from 
negotiators and analysts, even though it is critical to climate governance in influencing trust and 
incentives for international cooperation. Using spatial modeling and systemic international 
relations theories, we have found that, on average, diffusion adversely affects other states’ 
emission efficiency and that emission by states with competitive trade activity is a major source 
of the adverse diffusion. This result holds even if international and domestic countervailing 
factors are taken into account. Thus, for better climate governance, the adverse diffusion needs 
to be contained by a large coalition of numerous trading states to promote trust and incentives 
for international cooperation through reciprocity. 
This prescription opposes the idea of G20 with world-largest economies being the engine of 
global climate governance, instead favoring a large coalition of numerous trading states. This 
prescription will be confronted with an N-state prisoners’ dilemma which should be resolved by 
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prudent institutional arrangements, such as environmental aid or technological transfer.  
For future work, several refinements are in order. A first refinement hinges on the 
improvement of spatial modeling, particularly the construction of a precise spatial weight matrix 
that can capture the locally heterogeneous directions of diffusion. In the current paper, informed 
by the systemic international relations theories, we have been interested in knowing the globally 
homogeneous (or average) direction of diffusion constrained by the ρ coefficient, although we 
measured the heterogeneous magnitudes of connectivity between states. A second refinement 
calls for the incorporation of a detailed set of information, including distance, political ties, and 
cultural ties, into an analysis of connectivity. A third refinement enriches an out-of-sample 
simulation for prediction of diffusion and alternative coalitions based on improved information 
derived from the second refinement. Refined analyses will help improve the efficiency of 
coalition formation to contain adverse diffusion and facilitate international cooperation for 
climate governance. The analytical results are valuable in designing an effective international 
treaty to exploit diffusion in a more constructive way under a coalition of states appropriate for 
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1
 In general, spatial models include a spatial error model, spatial autoregressive model (SAR), spatial 
geographically weighted regression, Durbin model, and spatial auto correlation model (Fotherington, 
Brunsdon, and Charlton 2002). The SAR model has been most frequently used in the existing studies of 
policy diffusion and interdependence. We follow the existing studies on the use of SAR model. 
2
 Perkins and Neumayer (2008, 2009) use GDP divided by the amount emissions as the variable. 
3
 We calculated the extent of structural equivalence as the correlation coefficient (p) of two states’ 
exports at the bilateral level. A given state’s “export profile” is n-1 elements where n-1 is the total number 
of export partners of state i. p ranges between -1 and 1. The value of 1 means that two states have exactly 
the same profiles of bilateral exports to other states, while the value of -1 means that two states have the 
most dissimilar export profiles. We assume that only states sharing the same export market are likely to 
regard one another as competitors. Hence, we use elements of positive values only in our structural 
equivalence matrix, by replacing observations of negative values with zero. 
4
 We tested the four matrices (section 5, 6, 7, and 5&6&7) for cases of learning and competition, which 
generated eight matrices in total. We extracted the trade volumes of pollution-intensive sectors from the 
Freenstra data that include the United Nations’ Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) 
specifying industrial sectors of traded products. Through experiments, we chose the matrix based on 
section 5 for learning as the best fitted model whose results are reported in the text. This model always 
outperformed the model for competition.  
5
 The original data contain a variety of aid projects ranging from industrial, humanitarian, to 
environmental. To extract CO2-reducing projects from the data, we refined the data in the following 
20 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
manner. In the first step, we extracted the projects categorized as “energy (#23000)” and “environmental 
protection (#41000).” Because these projects, especially energy-related projects, include both 
CO2-increasing energy development projects and CO2-reducing renewable projects, we excluded the 
former projects that are coded as “dirty” and “unsure” in the data. In addition, we excluded aid projects 
given to a group of states in regions and bilateral aid to unspecified recipients. The environmental code 
indicates the degree of environmental intensity of a given project has more environmental in six different 
levels: “dirty strictly defined” “dirty broadly defined” “natural” “environmental strictly defined” 
“environmental broadly defined”, and “unsure”. (“unsure” is coded when project description did not 
provide sufficient information for environmental coding.)  
6
 We estimated a fixed-effect version of the SAR model because, as noted in the text, the data involve 
132 countries and the period of 17 years and thus entail a potential problem of heterogeneity that the 
version is well suited to overcome. In addition, we conducted an auxiliary Hausman test which indicated 
that the fixed-effect model performed better than its random-effect counterpart. In addition, we tested a 
spatial Durbin model (SDM) that assumes spatial lags for all independent variables. We could not reject 
the null hypothesis of all spatial coefficients being equal to zero at the standard statistical levels: Χ2(4) = 
4.70 (p= 0.32). Moreover, the likelihood ratio test based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC) 
indicates that SDM fares worse than the SAR: despite the added spatial components, the former does not 
improve the likelihood of predicting the data correctly beyond the latter. These results suggest that the 
SAR model is a reasonable spatial model for the data. 
7
 A caveat is in order: the types of IGOs included in the data vary substantially from pro-environment to 
pro-industry organizations and from humanitarian to military ones. Thus, it is plausible that the spatial 
analysis here could not discern a positive diffusion effect of pro-environment IGOs from a negative effect 
of other IGOs. Both types of IGOs might offset their effects, thus making the model (3) perform worse 
than its rival ones. 
8
 It is often discussed in the aid literature that the effectiveness of aid depends on the administrative and 
political efficacy of recipient states. To evaluate this claim, we added an interaction term between the aid 
variable and the Freedom-House civil liberty variable. The result shows that neither the interaction term 
nor the other separate variables gain statistical significance, thereby refuting the hypothesis of political 
sensitivity of aid. 
Table 1: Models of CO2 emissions performance
Explanatory	Variables Model1(OLS) Model2(Power) Model3(Trade) Model4(IGO)
Coef	[SE] Coef	[SE] Coef	[SE] Coef	[SE]
Main
Env	Aid	(ln) -1.2536 -0.7417 -0.7929 -0.6347
[0.30]*** [0.31]** [0.29]*** [0.31]**
Freedom	House -4.1549 -4.665 -5.4615 -5.1547
[2.89] [2.79]* [2.77]** [2.78]*
Urban	population	(%	of	total) 2.8493 4.4002 2.5273 4.6923
[0.81]*** [0.85]*** [0.78]*** [0.83]***
GDP	per	capita	(ln) -17.4023 -12.666 -6.2044 -6.3105
[5.03]*** [4.95]** [5.06] [5.17]
Kyoto	Protocol -14.8328 -9.5224 -8.5078 -4.9452
[4.35]*** [4.34]** [4.25]** [4.48]
Lagged	DV 0.7387 0.7318 0.7207 0.7263
[0.01]*** [0.01]*** [0.01]*** [0.01]***
Intercept 101.8208
[59.13]*
Spatial	ρ 0.108 0.3497 0.3281
[0.02]*** [0.03]*** [0.05]***
σ2 4186.7597 4115.5047 4157.1855
[118.05]*** [116.07]*** [117.22]***
Direct
Env	Aid	(ln) -0.719 -0.775 -0.6127
[0.34]** [0.32]** [0.34]*
Freedom	House -4.505 -5.3297 -5.0026
[3.01] [3.01]* [3.01]*
Urban	population	(%	of	total) 4.4097 2.5372 4.7055
[0.81]*** [0.74]*** [0.80]***
GDP	per	capita	(ln) -11.6691 -5.2188 -5.2354
[4.57]** [4.75] [4.81]
Kyoto	Protocol -9.0502 -8.1997 -4.2837
[4.46]** [4.37]* [4.60]
Indirect
Env	Aid	(ln) -0.0871 -0.3932 -0.3028
[0.04]** [0.16]** [0.16]*
Freedom	House -0.5903 -2.8139 -2.6922
[0.45] [1.74] [1.88]
Urban	population	(%	of	total) 0.5712 1.3095 2.4998
[0.20]*** [0.43]*** [0.85]***
GDP	per	capita	(ln) -1.4627 -2.5984 -2.544
[0.62]** [2.31] [2.34]
Kyoto	Protocol -1.1272 -4.2006 -2.072
[0.59]* [2.30]* [2.41]
Total
Env	Aid	(ln) -0.8061 -1.1683 -0.9155
[0.37]** [0.48]** [0.48]*
Freedom	House -5.0953 -8.1436 -7.6948
[3.44] [4.71]* [4.81]
Urban	population	(%	of	total) 4.9809 3.8467 7.2053
[0.97]*** [1.13]*** [1.53]***
GDP	per	capita	(ln) -13.1318 -7.8171 -7.7793
[5.09]*** [7.02] [7.06]
Kyoto	Protocol -10.1774 -12.4003 -6.3557
[4.98]** [6.59]* [6.92]
N.	of	observations/countries 2244/132 2244/132 2244/132 2244/132
Log	likelihood -12488.74 -12477.71 -12462.2 -12470.36








































Rate of Efficiency Improvement (%) 
Figure 1. Coalitions of States for Reducing Adverse Diffusion 
G20
Kyoto without US
Kyoto
GDPPC(>10000)
GDPPC(>5000)
